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A B S T R A C T
What makes political life in the United States so different from political life in France, 
Hungary or Argentina? This paper considers why societies “do politics” differently. We 
draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s criticism of substantialist thinking in sociology and on his 
conceptualization of the social space to propose a new way of relating methodological to 
theoretical claims in comparative political sociology. We do this by exploring and 
constructing a “space of polities” based on data from the 2004 World Values Survey, using 
relational statistical techniques (e.g., geometric data analysis). The main insight is that any 
single form of political action (e.g., joining a voluntary association, or a demonstration, or a 
boycott) only takes its meaning in the context of its objective relationship to other forms of 
political action and non-action that have currency in each particular society. We explore 
the diversity of polity types that actually exist and discuss how they emerge from similar 
conﬁgurations in countries’ spaces of political practices. We suggest that the reason for 
such clustering lies in similar political–historical trajectories. We conclude by arguing for a 
comparative approach that is sensitive to differences in overall systems of relationships. 
1. Introduction
There are threemainways of conceiving social “groupness” in sociology: groups can be deﬁned byactual patterns of social
interaction between individuals, by patterns of similarity and difference in shared individual characteristics (e.g. [138_TD$DIFF]gender,
age), or by patterns of similarity and difference in behavior (peoplewho “do” or “don [221_TD$DIFF]’t do” certain kinds of things, e.g. church-
goers or non-voters). In the ﬁrst instance, the drivingmetaphor is that of a social network of interconnectedness; the second
model proposes an a priori, theoretical reading of groupness; the third constructs groupness on the basis of shared [139_TD$DIFF]
observable behavior (see Bourdieu,1984;[140_TD$DIFF] e Nooy, 2003; Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010; Goldberg, 2011: 1399). For instance, we can
imagine membership in groups of musical listeners as an actual group of people who discuss or listen to music or go to
concerts together, as a pre-existing, theoretical group whose characteristics we think are relevant for the differentiation of
musical styles and marketing (e.g. African Americans); or as an analytical group constructed on the basis of a whole range of
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music-related practices and tastes (e.g. jazz fans). All individual practices – cultural, political, economic – in fact can be
apprehended in these three fundamental ways.
In this article, we explore the consequences of the third approach for analyzing how people “do politics” across nations.
We treat politics as a “space” of practices, grouping people on the basis of their observed behavior on a range of political
activities. [141_TD$DIFF]We represent a nation’s space of political practices as an emergent system of empirical relations of distance and
proximity. We ask: which types of political activities hang together empirically? For instance, are people who sign petitions
also likely to participate in boycotts? The answer, it turns out, varies across nations. Countries differ not only in the relative
prominence of different types of political activities (e.g. the Swedes aremore likely to be joiners than the Spanish), but also in
the relationships that these activities havewith each other (e.g., in Sweden, joining an association does not necessarilymean
participating actively in it; in the US, [222_TD$DIFF] it frequently does).
Comparing nations “space to space” – rather than “practice to practice” – [223_TD$DIFF]offers a way of understanding cross-national
differences in political activity that ismore attentive to the [143_TD$DIFF]cultural experience of politics in different social contexts. In short,
this approach is attuned to the empiricalmeaning of politics as expressed inpeople’s strategies of action (or inaction) (Swidler,
1986). Taken together and understood in a relational sense, a patterned ﬁeld of political “skills, habits, and styles” (ibid., 275)
forms what we may call a political culture.
[144_TD$DIFF]Our goal is thus to acknowledge both the fundamental diversity of political activities within nations and the stable
patterning of this diversity across nations. Using cross-national data on political practices, we elicit an inductive
conceptualization of the systematic ways in which nations may differ or resemble one another, “space to space”: countries
that load together in the cross-national analysis should look broadly similar in the within-[224_TD$DIFF]country analyses while retaining
speciﬁc features that are the product of their speciﬁc historical trajectories and culture. At the cross-national level, we ﬁnd
that countries differ mainly in terms of the volume and temporal structure of the political activities that take place on their
soil. But how canwe explain these patterns theoretically? Relying on the work of Jepperson (1993, 2002) and Jepperson and
Meyer (1991), we show that the underlying structure of difference and similarity across nations reﬂects, in part, historically
evolved variations in the extension, organization and meaning of community and authority across countries, or the
institutional shape of the national “polity” (Parsons, 1963). More speciﬁcally, we relate individual civic orientations as
expressed in various types of political behaviors to national differences in political integration, in the location of political
sovereignty (in the state versus society), and in dominant modes of interest representation (associational versus [145_TD$DIFF]corporate).
As Jepperson (1993, 1) puts it, “differing types of modern nation-[225_TD$DIFF]states produce distinctive kinds of public behavior and
talk."
2. From substantialism to relationalism
Pierre Bourdieu famously opposedwhat he called “substantialism”, or “nominal relativism” – that is, the tendency to give
ontological priority to things (parties, associations, organizations, etc. [226_TD$DIFF]) – to his own “relationalism.” Substantialism typically
proceeds by deﬁning or describing the properties (historical, organizational, cultural,[227_TD$DIFF] etc.) of things prior to their being in
interaction or in relation to other entities ([147_TD$DIFF] esmond, 2014; Emirbayer, 1997; Martin, 2003). A strictly substantialist reading
on political mobilization would, for instance, emphasize the rise of grievances, the organizational strategies of individual
movements, the ‘identity’ or the emotional engagement of their members, as inherent qualities and sui generis explanations
for outcomes.
But just like psychological processes are insufﬁcient to explain individual behavior (Durkheim, 1997), internal processes
hardly account forwhy socialmovements dowhat they do. So analysts have introduced a range of relational considerations –
to public authorities, powerful patrons, public opinion, other social movements, or indeed the whole “political opportunity
structure” – to understand what drives the “dynamics of contention.” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001) Such relations,
however, are generally conceptualized in interactive terms rather than in structural ones (i.e. in terms of actual connection
rather than relations of behavioral distance and proximity [228_TD$DIFF]). Thus, their focus tends to be onprocesses of diffusion andmutual
inﬂuence betweenmovements, on the circulation of repertoires as they are being publicly performed (e.g. Tilly, 2008), or on
state-movements relations.
[148_TD$DIFF]Although concrete networks of relations are often at play in politics (e.g. seeMische, 2007), the fact is that individuals and
groups may position themselves in relation to one another without having a personal connection – workers vis-à-vis their
abstract bosses (“shareholders”, “capitalists”), women and men as categories vis-à-vis one another, or Catholics versus
Protestants. More prosaïcally, the people who claim to like “anything but heavy metal” (Bryson, 1996) do not simply state a
negative relation to the acoustic properties of this particular music style: their “dislike” may express, fundamentally, a
distant relation to heavy metal listeners and their underlying social properties (in this case a lower class/lower education
background), which are pervasively intertwined with people’s understanding and appreciation of the music. Likewise, we
can assume that those people who state in theWorld Values Survey that they “would never sign a petition” do not express a
personal relationship to the abstract object “petition,” but rather a relation of distance to the (perceived) social properties of
the people who sign petitions. In other words, political position-takings, like all likes and dislikes, act as symbolic markers of
membership in categories of people, rather than as expressions of purely individual, disembedded political preferences
(Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005). In [149_TD$DIFF]another telling illustration, Eliasoph (1998) ﬁnds that voluntary association members in
the United States make sure to articulate their public concerns in a very private way, explicitly eschewing the language of
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politics because they fear being perceived as ‘activists’ as opposed to belonging to the more palatable category of “self-
interested citizens.”
The broader point is that what heavy metal represents, or what signing a petition means, depends, respectively, on the
whole social structure of the space of musical tastes, and the whole structure of the space of political practices, which of
course also varies across countries depending on speciﬁc institutional conﬁgurations and embodied collective
representations (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003). We can better comprehend what petitioning [150_TD$DIFF]or striking means by placing
each practice not only in relation to the particular institutional context and political opportunity structure in which it is
embedded, but also in relation to the whole space of political likes and dislikes, actions and non-actions, possibilities and
impossibilities, which are readily observable in that context. In this respect we follow not only Bourdieu but many other
sociologists who, especially in the study of cultural tastes (Breiger, 2000; Lena & Petersen, 2008; Petersen & Kern, 1996;
Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010; Goldberg, 2011) or systems of belief and meaning ([151_TD$DIFF]Mohr, 1998; Martin, 2000; Mohr & Bogdanov,
2013; Ghaziani & Mohr, 2014) use quantitative tools to map shared patterns of practice or understanding (also see Silber,
1995 on the use of spatial metaphors in sociology).
2.1. From Politics on Paper to the Space of Political Practices
One of the best illustrations of the difference between the two analytical strategies (substantialist versus relational) can
be found in Pierre Bourdieu’s critique and re-conceptualization of class analysis (see especially 1984,1985). Marxist analysis,
Bourdieu argues, provides us with a theoretical vocabulary for talking about classes as deﬁned by certain properties (e.g. the
relationship to themeans of production) [229_TD$DIFF]and for analyzingwhat happens to classes (deﬁned in thisway) as they interactwith
one another. But Marxist “classes” are abstract constructions, “classes on paper” (Bourdieu,1985, p. 725) whose “groupness”
is derived from a theoretical position [230_TD$DIFF]rather than from the empirical reality of practices. “Social classes do not exist. .[231_TD$DIFF] . .What
exists is a social space, a space of differences, in which classes exist in some sense in a state of virtuality, not as something
given but as something to be done” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 12, emphasis in text).
From this point of view, two individuals who share a similar position in social space, whether this position is deﬁned one-
dimensionally (e.g. in terms of ownership of the means of production) or multi-dimensionally (e.g. in terms of relative
endowments in economic, cultural and social capital), do not naturally form a group. What creates “groupness” is, ﬁrst, the
fact that the probability to coalesce (that is, to form institutionalized entities) rises with social proximity: the afore-
mentioned socio-demographic qualities will, under particular circumstances, translate into empirical proximity.
Additionally, there is the cultural labor of group making, the institutionalization of stable properties to cover an otherwise
disparate aggregate of individuals through the objectiﬁcation of new representations (through performative acts and
phrases—e.g. “workers of the world, unite!”), organizations (with chairs, delegates, members, etc.), and symbols (Bourdieu,
1985; Brubaker, 2004; Garﬁnkel [152_TD$DIFF]& Rawls, 2002; Sewell, 1996; Swartz, 2013; Wedeen, 2002).
[153_TD$DIFF] inally, groupness emerges from the shared subjective construction of the objective world ([154_TD$DIFF]Bourdieu, 1985, p. 727). It is
the actors’ perceptions of the social world –which are themselves relationally determined through the practical experience
of thisworld, [232_TD$DIFF]particularly the struggles, conscious and unconscious, over the distribution of symbolic power (i.e. the power to
name, categorize, label, and institute) – that contribute to produce and reproduce relatively stable relationships (whichmay
therefore take on an “objective” character). One of the greatest achievements of Distinction comes from making such
concrete groupings visible by grounding the notion of class in the unconscious “collective orchestration of practices” rather
than in conscious, purposive collective action. Classes,[155_TD$DIFF] in this perspective, are the empirically realized sharing of certain
lifestyles and social properties. Rather than being posited [233_TD$DIFF]a priori, coherence emerges from the actual practices of agents [234_TD$DIFF]–
that is, from the empirical analysis of social closeness or distance (where distance is measured by using some form of
geometric data analysis.)
What does all this have to do with politics?Wemay proceed by analogy here. From a relational point of view, a sociology
that deﬁnes its object to be the study of “social movements” or “social capital” or “voluntary associations” is just as
problematic as Marxist class analysis—and for the same reasons. Treating different forms of political activity as pre-existing,
unproblematic constructs makes the relational moment secondary to [235_TD$DIFF](i.e. a consequence of [236_TD$DIFF]) the deﬁnitional one.
Furthermore, such a strategy establishes the a priori comparability of objects across polities thatmay largely obscure the true
empirical differences, which are not to be found in the objects as such, but instead in the relational space within which these
objects get constituted. Each form of political activity (e.g. demonstrations, voting, voluntary associations’ membership) is
merely a point in a space of relations whose shape and structure still needs to be determined.
Spaces of political practices may thus be constructed out of a wide array of indicators. [237_TD$DIFF] Examples include the types of
commitments (in time or money) people make in [238_TD$DIFF]such practices, the types of actions they carry out (participating in
demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins; signing petitions; writing checks; issuing statements); the types of organizations involved
(e.g. public or private; large or small); [239_TD$DIFF]and the social characteristics of their members or leaders. Correlatively, it is this space,
this totality, which ought to constitute the true object of study—both what needs to be explained and what explains the
nature and shape of the constitutive elements.
One great advantage of such an analytical position is that it allows for a rather capacious deﬁnition of the political. Thus in
his holistic treatment of “democracy in America,” [156_TD$DIFF]de Tocqueville (2000) [157_TD$DIFF]saw the beneﬁts of integrating into his analysis such
different objects as themedia, associations, the courts, the voting system, and administrative structures. Likewise, we should
try to incorporate as many varied types of data as possible to map out, for selected nations, a space of political practices.
3
Please cite this article in press as: M. Fourcade, et al., Political space and the space of polities: Doing politics across nations,
Poetics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2015.12.002
(Ancelovici, 2009) Such a strategy [240_TD$DIFF]is analogous to Bourdieu’s efforts to map the space of cultural practices out of such
disparate data as the food people eat, the music they listen to, the magazines they read, or the sports they practice.
2.2. From polities on paper to the space of polities
Even though Bourdieu himself never ventured into full-ﬂedged cross-national comparisons, such comparisons are always
implicit in his work. For instance, he rejected as “substantialist” critiques that dismissed his indicators of “distinction” (e.g.
going to a museum or listening to opera) as irrelevant in the U.S. context. His relational model, he argued, does not
presuppose in anyway that it is the same lifestyle practices that will establish social distinction in France and in America (e.g.
1998,1–3). Hemade a similar point in a telling side comment about poorwomen’s voting patterns in France and Japan (1998,
4):
“In Japan, the rate of participation in general elections is highest among the least educated women of rural districts,
whereas in France, as I demonstrated in an analysis of non-response to opinion polls, the rate of non-response – and of
indifference to politics – is especially high among women and among the least educated and most economically and
socially dispossessed. This is an example of a false difference that conceals a real one: the apathy associated with
dispossession of the means of production of political opinions, which is expressed in France as simple absenteeism,
translates, in the case of Japan as a sort of apolitical participation.”
Ultimately, determiningwhich practices create social differences, and inwhichway, is always context-[241_TD$DIFF]dependent.We can
only reveal them exposing the “principles of objective differentiation” at work in each particular social space. In fact, the only
assumption that is necessary to the theory is the notion that every society is a society of difference. But different societies will
always have different principles of social differentiation.[242_TD$DIFF] In socialist societies, for instance, cultural and political capital may
have played a proportionately bigger role than in non-socialist societies [243_TD$DIFF]because economic capital is “ofﬁcially out of
bounds." (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 16)
To sum up, we take as our object the relationship between two structures: the structure given by the relations among the
political practices found in each particular country and the structure given by the relative positions of states. Within a social
space or ﬁeld,[244_TD$DIFF] a position is deﬁned [245_TD$DIFF]“by a system of relevant (meaning efﬁcient) properties that allow it to be situated in
relation to all others in the structure of global distribution of properties[246_TD$DIFF]” (Bourdieu, 1996: 231). Different position-takings,[247_TD$DIFF]
such as acts of political volition (petition-signing, demonstrations, voting), associational memberships, volunteer activity or
even, as others have shown, the simple ability to express one [248_TD$DIFF]’s opinionwhen queried (Jepperson,1993; Bourdieu,1984,1993;
Laurison, 2015 [249_TD$DIFF]), correspond to different positions in social space. But different political formations also have different “rules
of the game” relative to the production of opinions as a form of political competence (Bourdieu, 1984; Herbst, 1992) [250_TD$DIFF]or to
participation in activist politics. Political competence and political dispositions (or the cognitive, emotive, perceptual and
action schemas throughwhich people relate to politics, and which are themselves structured by the social worlds they are a
part of—see Bourdieu, 2000:155) thus mediate between the space of positions and that of position-takings (i.e., political
opinions and political practices). For example, countries like Sweden, Finland, and Iceland occupy similar positions within a
space of polities.[251_TD$DIFF] This is largely due to their broadly similar institutional properties. Correspondingly, on average,
respondents from those countries tend to take political positions that reﬂect the institutional properties of their country and
that are opposed to the position-takings of, for instance, Russian or Hungarian respondents (countries that havemuchmore
strongly “statist” traditions).
What this suggests for us is that the objective differences observed in the structure of the national political spaces, and
beyond in the space of polities, are homologically related to subjective differences in the actual experience, socialization, [252_TD$DIFF]and
representation – in short, the culture – of politics. Different practices and strategies will appear more or less doable,
thinkable, or emotionally meaningful (Almond & Verba, 1963; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005) both across different national
political spaces [253_TD$DIFF]and within each national space depending on the institutionalized relational conﬁguration of practices,
strategies andmovements. Hence wemay not simply relate the well-documented differences in the strategies and practices
of strikers in France and the United States (Friedman, 1988) to differences in the institutional or resource environment
strikers face, but, more fundamentally and phenomenologically, to their culturally different relation to politics and claims-
making as expressed in the broader structure of each of these countries [254_TD$DIFF]’ political “space.”
3. The space of polities in practice: an empirical illustration
3.1. Data and methods
We use data from the World Values Survey (henceforth WVS) to conduct a relational analysis of political practices.
Simply put, we want to determine which [255_TD$DIFF]practices appear closely related to [256_TD$DIFF]one another and which ones appear to be
distant from [257_TD$DIFF]one another (that is, in terms of the people who carry out these practices and the countries in which they are
represented [258_TD$DIFF]).
The dataset obviously constrains the things we can [259_TD$DIFF]examine: the WVS contains information about individuals’
membership and participation in associations, demonstrations, strikes, petitions, boycotts and building occupations. This is [260_TD$DIFF]
quite a broad range of data. However, [261_TD$DIFF]the dataset is strongly biased toward the cultural repertoire of the Western social
4
Please cite this article in press as: M. Fourcade, et al., Political space and the space of polities: Doing politics across nations,
Poetics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2015.12.002
movement as it crystallized between 1800 and 1900, while overlooking many types of political activity that could be of
interest: voting, going to political rallies, or participating in more violent [262_TD$DIFF]actions (e.g. joining militias, participating in acts of
sabotage or terrorism [263_TD$DIFF]).
For all its shortcomings,[264_TD$DIFF] however, the WVS possesses an amazing strength: [265_TD$DIFF] its cross-national character. This [266_TD$DIFF]allows us
both to expand our theoretical ambitions and go beyond Bourdieu’s use of geometric data analysis to show the method’s
usefulness for thinking comparatively. Because the WVS is a rather crude instrument for carrying out this kind of analysis, [267_TD$DIFF]
whenever possible, we supplement it with references to more elaborate ethnographic and historical accounts of the polities
we discuss. [268_TD$DIFF] The fourth wave of the [269_TD$DIFF]World Values Survey, conducted from 2000 to 2004, asks a broad range of questions
regarding political participation inmore than 70 countries. We focus onmiddle-[270_TD$DIFF] and high-income countries. After removing
additional cases due to missing or unavailable data, our ﬁnal sample includes the 33 countries listed in Table 1.1
The main advantage of the survey is its remarkable breadth, which owes a lot to its principal investigator’s ambition of
mapping cultural change in societies across theworld (See Inglehart,1990,1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart &Welzel,
2005). Its main shortcoming is the near-identiﬁcation of culture with values and feelings, which runs into the delicate
problem of comparing subjective representations across cultural contexts. As MacIntyre (1971, 173–4) famously stated: [273_TD$DIFF]“We
Table 1
Frequencies of different forms of political activity, selected countries, WVS.
Percentage of citizens who have participated in the following . . .
Country Petition Boycott Demonstration Strike Occupation Association member Association volunteer
Argentina 22.76 1.97 13.33 5.24 1.88 28.75 15.47
Austria 56.07 9.69 16 2.32 0.75 51.58 24.05
Belgium 71.77 12.13 39.9 8.7 5.89 54.08 28.92
Belarus 8.77 4.14 16.26 1.06 0.63 8.5 10.7
Canada 74.12 19.0 19.66 7.41 2.83 61.06 39.56
Chile 19.48 4.99 15.67 8.71 4.16 36.92 33.08
Czech Rep. 58.4 9.03 27.6 10.37 0.82 46.75 27.25
Denmark 56.78 24.87 29.33 22.22 2.82 61.58 30.6
Finland 50.76 15.2 14.78 2.5 0.1 53.66 31.98
France 67.98 12.96 39.4 12.75 9.28 32.38 20.8
Hungary 15.85 2.86 4.9 0.94 0.52 15.0 10.4
Ireland 60.65 8.47 21.89 6.35 2.06 46.44 26.48
Italy 54.62 10.32 34.78 5.37 8.03 33.65 21.05
Japan 63.21 8.41 12.89 2.67 0.09 33.48 13.95
Luxembourg 52.69 9.07 30.27 7.32 1.58 52.85 28.32
Mexico 19.1 2.41 4.21 2.54 2.14 32.83 27.82
Netherlands 61.44 21.88 32.3 4.59 5.39 88.04 43.57
Peru 22.4 7.75 17.04 3.98 1.7 39.57 31.71
Philippines 10.56 5.13 6.78 2.34 0.76 41.5 41.67
Poland 21.13 4.34 8.81 4.61 3.04 13.52 8.86
Portugal 26.94 5.74 16.99 3.55 1.36 20.4 11.8
Romania 10.72 1.89 14.82 1.16 0.49 10.03 7.42
Russian Fed. 11.69 2.49 23.91 1.55 0.65 9.12 3.92
Slovakia 59.64 4.25 14.45 2.3 0.91 46.13 38.99
South Africa 26.55 13.58 13.52 6.13 2.66 46.6 30.83
Spain 27.41 5.76 26.42 8.15 2.69 22.37 12.79
Sweden 87.27 33.97 35.84 4.6 2.95 72.41 40.1
Turkey 15.21 6.31 7.54 2.16 0.66 5.56 4.81
Ukraine 13.93 4.91 18.32 4.47 0.74 12.55 7.03
Great Britain 80.71 16.56 13.33 8.6 2.1 27.1 41.9
United States 81.32 24.87 20.75 5.84 4.13 79.25 55.17
W. Germany 47.0 10.19 21.72 1.66 0.82 41.27 16.1
E. Germany 62.3 6.35 46.82 1.85 1.2 29.23 12.11
Average 31.95 9.64 17.65 4.7 2.49 37.91 25.83
(in bold: highest and lowest scores)
1 In addition to countries that had missing data in the WVS [271_TD$DIFF](e.g. Singapore and South Korea), we also eliminated some of the smaller countries onwhich
historical information, which we use to enrich our analysis, was difﬁcult to gather (e.g. Baltic states). Also, we removed Greece because it was an outlier on
several variables (however,[272_TD$DIFF] doing so did not affect the general pattern of our results).
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cannot hope to compare an Italian[274_TD$DIFF]’s attitude to his government's actswith an Englishman's in respect of the pride each takes;
any comparison would have to begin from the different range of virtues and emotions incorporated in the different social
institutions.[275_TD$DIFF]”
For this reason, we focus our analysis on the few questions that are directly concerned with people’s reported behavior [276_TD$DIFF]
(e.g., “Have you ever attended a street demonstration[277_TD$DIFF]?” “Have you ever signed a petition [278_TD$DIFF]?”). Such questions are arguably
better suited to construct valid and reliable measures in a cross-national and multi-lingual survey than questions about
personal views and attitudes. Furthermore, practices can always be taken to index systems of representations and
dispositions. [279_TD$DIFF] In other words, people’s political practices (and non-practices) constitute the emergent form of their political
habitus. [280_TD$DIFF] o quote MacIntyre (1971, 173–74) again: “It is an obvious truism that no institution or practice is what it is, or does
what it does, independently of what anyone whatsoever thinks or feels about it. For institutions and practices are always
partially, even if to differing degrees, constituted by what certain people think and feel about them.” [281_TD$DIFF] o be sure, surveys are
no better able to capture the different phenomenological [282_TD$DIFF]qualities of similarly named practices across nations (e.g. voting) as
they are at capturing the differentmeaning of similar phrases and stated representations (e.g. trust in the legal system, or the
police). Still, practices are more easily measurable: people are likely to knowwhether they have gone to the polls and cast a
vote in the last election. By contrast, rating one[248_TD$DIFF]’s trust in the legal system, [283_TD$DIFF] for example, not only requires a different kind of
political competence [284_TD$DIFF]but also supposes that individuals' implicit rating systems are commensurable, both within and across
nations.
Next, we provide a description of multivariate relationships in our data [285_TD$DIFF]by mapping out the space of political practices
both across and within societies. To accomplish this,[286_TD$DIFF] we employ principal components analysis (PCA), as well as multiple
correspondence analysis (MCA). These techniques are analogous in that they involve the reduction of complex multivariate
relationships into a smaller number of dimensions in amanner that highlights the structure of relationships among variables
or categories (Greenacre & Blasius, 2006; Harcourt, 2002; Le Roux & Rouanet, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Despite some differences in terminology, MCA and PCA are quite similar (Greenacre & Blasius, 2006). For instance, the
coordinates of [287_TD$DIFF]an MCA can be interpreted analogously to the loadings of a PCA. However, MCA is rooted in the analysis of
categorical data; [288_TD$DIFF] it is appropriate for the analysis of individual-level discrete behaviors (e.g., Have you signed a petition?) [289_TD$DIFF]or
ordinal data that may have highly non-linear effects and are therefore better treated as distinct categories. MCA is of
particular interest in our within-country analyses of political behavior, as we observe complex relations that are not easily
reducible to linear patterns.
A signiﬁcant advantage of both methods is that [290_TD$DIFF]the two different structures can be represented spatially. This is often
done through the use of bi-plots, whichmap not only component factor loadings (orMCA “coordinates”) but also the relative
location of cases within our data on those same dimensions. For example we can visualize the relationship between states
and between political practices or membership in organizations. Bourdieu (1984) represents together a social space (e.g.
demographic characteristics) and a cultural space (e.g. lifestyle practices). This greatly enhances the interpretability of factor
scores and provides richer description for the purposes of inductive analysis. Finally, we contextualize our geometric data
analyses with comparative case studies of several different polities. This allows us not only to go deeper into our
interpretations but [291_TD$DIFF]also to check them for consistency with what we know from detailed historical and ethnographic case
and comparative studies conducted by others.
Our combined use of the MCA and PCA also departs to varying degrees from previous efforts to map cross-national
patterns of political attitudes and behavior,[292_TD$DIFF] such as Inglehart’s factor-[293_TD$DIFF]analytic approach (Inglehart, 1997, Inglehart & Baker,
2000) [294_TD$DIFF]or more recent efforts that combine factor analysis with regression (Bonikowski, 2010) or employ Fuzzy Sets (Bail
2008). Inglehart’s efforts center on demonstrating that individual attitudes vary with country and level of development, and
that patterns of cross-national differences map onto known or suspected cultural differences among nations (e.g., Protestant
versus Catholic versus Confucian). Factor analysis ﬂows naturally from Inglehart’s vision of a latent construct (e.g.,
postmaterialism) that [295_TD$DIFF]underlying individual attitudes and societal differences.2 Bonikowski (2010) goes beyond this, using
regression analysis of relational predictors to explain patterns of cultural similarity. Bonikowski's study shares our interest in
relationalism (among countries; not at the level of individual practices) and an emphasis on the historical patterns (e.g.,
imperial history) that may generate meaningful institutional and cultural conﬁgurations. Indeed, onemight explain some of
our observed societal differenceswith similar regressionmethods. Bail (2008) provides another intriguing alternative rooted
in fuzzy-[296_TD$DIFF]set analysis that in some ways falls closer to the spirit of our enterprise, as it is more focused on conﬁgurations of
meaning (though again there is no attempt to link cross-national variationwith intra-national patterns). Set-[297_TD$DIFF]theoretic tools
provide an alternative to traditional linear analyses that are particularly suited to identifying complex conﬁgurations, and
represent a plausible alternative to our approach (if one has sufﬁcient prior theory and knowledge to guide calibration of set
membership).
Rather than aspiring to cluster or predict country cultural differences based on attitudes, this study instead interrogates
country differences via [162_TD$DIFF]a relational analysis of national-level political practices to better understand the meaning of societal
differences. Our primary goal is both inductive and theoretical: by locating countries on a “map,”weargue, we are better able
to produce the analytical constructs that will guide and organize our interpretation of cross-national patterns.
2 PCA andMCA are not anchored in the notion of latent variables, but simply reducemultivariate data to a small number of dimensionswhilemaximizing
explained variation.
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3.2. Measures
Measures of individual- [298_TD$DIFF]level political practiceswere used in twoways. First, we aggregated the data at the national level –
computing country means – to explore the varying structure of polities via [299_TD$DIFF]PCA. Later, we analyze the individual-level
measures themselves in within-country [300_TD$DIFF]MCA.
Total membership in voluntary associations (Member).[164_TD$DIFF] The WVS includes a series of questions to determine whether
individuals belong to associations of various types, including “political associations,[301_TD$DIFF]” “religious groups,” and so on. We
summed these dichotomous measures [302_TD$DIFF]to yield a count of different types of associations to which an individual belongs. [303_TD$DIFF]We
used country means in the aggregate analyses. [304_TD$DIFF]Our MCA plots use discrete categories of zero, one, two, and three or more
memberships. [305_TD$DIFF]We collapsed higher values to reduce clutter on the MCA biplots.
[306_TD$DIFF]Working for voluntary associations (Volunteer).[164_TD$DIFF] The WVS also includes items identifying whether individuals do “unpaid
work” for voluntary associations of various types (what [166_TD$DIFF]Curtis, Baer, and Grabb (2001) refer to as “working memberships”). [307_TD$DIFF]
We constructed aggregate PCA measures and MCA categories for volunteering [308_TD$DIFF]in the same manner as membership, above.
[167_TD$DIFF]Participation in demonstrations [168_TD$DIFF] (Demonstrate), participation in strikes[169_TD$DIFF] (Strike), participation in boycotts[170_TD$DIFF] (Boycott), occupying
buildings (Occupy), and signing petitions [171_TD$DIFF] (Petition). The WVS identiﬁes respondents who have “actually done” each type of
activity. [309_TD$DIFF] It also inquires about attitudes, distinguishing thosewho “might do” the activity versus thosewho “would never” do
such a thing. Aggregate analyses examine the country proportion of individuals who have “actually done” each activity,
versus all others. MCA plots examine the full range of WVS categories.
[310_TD$DIFF]We include additional individual-level demographic [311_TD$DIFF]measures as supplementary variables in MCA plots:
Gender. Coded dichotomously (male = 1, female =0).
Education. Coded ordinally, as highest level of education completed. To reduce clutter in theMCA plots, we reduced this to
three categories: primary degree or less; some secondary or a secondary degree, and those with at least some tertiary
education.
Religiosity. Coded ordinally, from0 to 3. Zero indicates religion is “Not At All Important”, 1 “Not Very Important”, 2 “Rather
Important” and 3 “Very Important”.
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Biplot of political practices, Factors 1 and 2.
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[172_TD$DIFF]4. “Doing politics” across countries
Our ﬁrst empirical task is to describe how countries fall vis-à-vis one another in terms of the political practices of their
citizens (what we call here the “space of polities”). Table 1 offers a summary of the main cross-national variations in a range
of political practices for a group of countries selected from theWorld Values Survey. Countries exhibit very sharp differences.
For instance, the highest frequency for street demonstrations and building occupations occurs in France (39% and [173_TD$DIFF]9%,
respectively); but these practices remainmuchmore rare in Finland (15% and 0.1%). Similarly, the percentage of citizens who
have ever signed a petition varies, for instance, from less than [174_TD$DIFF]6% in Turkey to over 87% in Sweden; even a country where the
return of democracy occurred some 40 years ago, Spain, still stands barely over 27%.
The principal component analysis presented in Figs. 1 and 2 helps us elaborate the cross-national differences much
further. Fig. 1 represents the space of ﬁve basic political practices, overlaid with the space of polities.3 In this ﬁrst ﬁgure,
practices related to association-[313_TD$DIFF]joining (membership in voluntary associations and work in those associations) are not
included. Fig. 2, by contrast, is based on the same data but the two associational variables are now active—that is, they
participate actively in the determination of the space.
4.2. The volume and temporal structure of political action as organizing dimensions
The two ﬁgures showa basic opposition between the “doers,” on the right hand side of themap, and the “[175_TD$DIFF]non-doers”, or at
least less active polities on the left, which are not associated with any type of political activity and represent – by far – the
bulk of the countries included in this analysis. Most of the Eastern and central European countries (e.g.Hungary, the Russian [176_TD$DIFF]
Federation, Ukraine, etc . . . ) and Latin American nations (Mexico and especially Argentina), as well as some Western
European nations like Portugal, are found in the latter category, while the United States, Sweden and the Netherlands are the
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Biplot of political practices, with membership and volunteering, Factors 1 and 2.
3 The Fig.1 biplot is based [312_TD$DIFF]on country averages calculated from responses of 81,826 individuals. Later ﬁgures have slightly fewer cases due to the inclusion
of additional variables, which are missing for some individuals.
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three countries with the highest proportions of peoplewho have been involved in the categories of activities surveyed in the
WVS. The second factor opposes the countries whose citizens focus comparatively more onmembership activities (Sweden,
US, Canada) to those whose citizens “do politics” mainly through means of episodic types of action. Keeping with the
Bourdieuian conceptual language, a simple way to interpret these patterns is to point out that while the ﬁrst dimension
captures the relative volume of political action, the second dimension focuses on the structure of this action in terms of the
time involvement required. Contributing most to Factor 2 are the volunteering variable, on the one hand, and the street
demonstrations, building occupations and strikes variables, on the other. The United States and France exemplify the polar
opposition. In the US, volunteering is commonwhile contentious actions are not. Conversely, in France, participation centers
on forms of action that reﬂect a pattern of intermittent outbursts rather than one of long-term, repeated commitment.
Boycotts and petitions, interestingly, fall where we may expect them [314_TD$DIFF]on this temporal continuum, with boycotts (which
require repeated action) being closer to the membership and work variables [315_TD$DIFF]and petitions contributing nothing on Factor
2 once the associational variables are taken into account.
Time, then, appears to [177_TD$DIFF]be a key dimension that [178_TD$DIFF]organizes the practice of politics across nations. In the space of polities,
countries differ from one another ﬁrst in terms of how much time their citizens devote to political activities (with the
majority devoting almost no time at all), and second, in terms of the rhythm of their time commitments to politics – [316_TD$DIFF]i.e.
whether those citizens who are active act in amanner that is regular and repeated, as opposed to episodic and concentrated.
Three broad ensembles of countries thus emerge from the analysis. First are the countries that are lowon Factor [317_TD$DIFF] ; they have
a fairly “inactive” citizenry (at least from the point of view of the practices surveyed in the World Values Survey). These
countries are clustered on the left- [318_TD$DIFF]hand side of Fig.1. The second set, [319_TD$DIFF] in the upper right quadrant of the graph,[320_TD$DIFF] comprises the
polities that have a [321_TD$DIFF]relatively “active” citizenry (high on Factor 1) [322_TD$DIFF]but relatively more episodic time commitments (high on
Factor 2). A third group consists of the polities that have a more “active” citizenry (high on Factor 1) but [323_TD$DIFF]have relativelymore
stable and repeated [324_TD$DIFF]time commitments (low on Factor 2); these are clustered in the lower right quadrant.
4.3. Interpreting the time structure: polity integration and stateness
Until now we have not said much about the underlying political structures that may lie beneath these political patterns.
The neo-institutionalist literature in sociology helps provide some clariﬁcation. Jepperson (1993: 91,2002) describes those
countries that are low on Factor 1 in our analysis (i.e. our “less active” polities) as “poorly integrated politically,” while
Jepperson andMeyer (1991:216) refer to them as “segmental” polities. Even thoughmost of these states are now functioning
democracies – and some have even been democratic for several decades – they share a fairly recent authoritarian past. The
majority of them, indeed, fall into two clearly identiﬁable categories: [325_TD$DIFF]1) vassal states with a long history of subjugation to a
strong external rule (Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland for the last two centuries); and [326_TD$DIFF] ) former imperial powers that
were ruledmilitarily from above in the pursuit of “autarchy and dictatorial modernization” (Derluguian, 2007, 5) throughout
much of the twentieth century. [327_TD$DIFF] Russia, Turkey, and Portugal are canonical examples of this second path. Indeed, [328_TD$DIFF] these states
were often just as brutal vis-à-vis their own populations as they were vis-à-vis the populations of conquered territories.
In both types of societies, rebellion against the center carried very tangible risks for the people who got involved [329_TD$DIFF]and
almost always ended in failure. The case of Hungary, the lowest country on Factor 1, offers a striking illustration of this point.
Unlike many other states, including neighbors like Poland, Hungary “did not experience a truly successful revolution” in the
modern era.[330_TD$DIFF] To the contrary, nationalist and revolutionary hopes and impulses were repeatedly crushed, so that the country
has had “very fewpositive experiences” to build upon. The uprising in 1848, the post-1918 revolutions and the 1956 revolt [331_TD$DIFF]all
failed, sometimes in a quite catastrophic manner (Seleny, 1999, 504–05). Contemporary scholarship on Hungary
characterizes the society as politically “quiescent,” rather disengaged, and pragmatically oriented toward elite consensus
and bargaining in spite of high levels of political dissatisfaction (Seleny,1999; Ekiert & Kubik,1998, 554–556; Hankiss,1989).
This diagnosis not only agreeswithHungary’s location on Factor 1 in our data (the country is very lowon every type of action)
but also on Factor 2 (Hungary is positioned away from the more episodic/contentious types of political activities).
Hungary is locatedveryclosetoPolandonthemapof thespaceofpolities.Yetwhile thisproximitycapturessimilarities inthe
two countries’ paths into political modernity, Poland's history was also distinctive in important ways. Poland especially
contrastswithHungaryonFactor 2, that is, in termsof its level of contentiouspolitics. This is not surprising since, as Selenyputs
it,“bytheendof theSecondWorldWarHungariansandPoleshadreasonsto learnprofoundlydifferent lessonsabouttheefﬁcacy
of open resistance and revolution.” (1999:504) Compared to Hungary, Seleny continues, Poland had a much more successful
history of rebellion: it emerged victorious in the Polish-Soviet war of 1920–1921.While the country suffered very heavy losses
during World War II, it came out of it “free of the weight of collaboration and concomitant issues of moral complexity that
burdened Hungary” (505) [332_TD$DIFF]and found itself on the winning side when the Allies declared victory in 1945. Finally, after Poland
turned to communism, the Soviet Union treated the country relatively leniently in comparison to other Eastern Bloc followers.
The Poles interpreted this (whether correctly or not) as an acknowledgement of their reputation for open resistance and
rebellion (Seleny, 1999, 505). From the standpoint of politically conditioning experiences, Poland indeed retained a lively
political counterculture and an independent Church, even during the imposition of martial law.
Thus, evenwhenwe zoom in on a segment of the social space in question, we also ﬁnd “self-similar” regularities (Abbott,
2001; Bourdieu, 1984; Lorrain & White, 1971). As may be expected from the hypothesized effects of collective memory,
Poland indeed exhibits the highest level of disruptive protest actions, especially by unions, against the state among the four
post-communist nations studied by Seleny (1999). Polish society is marked by relatively “high levels of political
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mobilization, contentious party competition around several overlapping, deep ethical-ideological cleavages, relatively low
levels of elite consensus, and a moralistic political discourse [333_TD$DIFF]” (Seleny, 1999: 433).
[334_TD$DIFF]Let us now turn to yet another country that is low on Factor 1. Like Hungary, Argentina also has a history of relative de-
politicization, but it is a very different one. In Argentina, habits of public engagement avoidance actually go back to before
twentieth century authoritarianism and its military control of practically all civilian institutions. As many accounts have
suggested, because formal political participationwas restricted to citizens, because the proportion of immigrants among the
Argentinean populationwas very high, and ﬁnally because the procedure for naturalizationwas very cumbersome and thus
rarely picked up, politics in nineteenth century Argentina took the shape of a game between local political factions that left
the vast majority of the population indifferent (Rock, 1985; Sabato, 1992). This politico-demographic situation, combined
with an oligarchic inﬂuence thatwas always acute even by Latin American standards (Collier & Collier,1991:129–131), forged
a form of citizenship that was somewhat more alienated than elsewhere on the continent.
What these examples suggest is that political habits might reproduce themselves through their inscription, ﬁrst, in the
political structure itself and, second, in the memory of past events embodied in people and institutions [335_TD$DIFF]and passed on
through interpersonal interactions and formal and informal socialization (Tilly, 2008). Thus,[336_TD$DIFF] Howard (2002) ﬁnds in his
“experiential approach to societal continuity and change” that the legacy of communism (which, as we have shown in the
Hungarian case, often extends back further to an authoritarian pre-communist past) explains in large part the “collective
non-participation” habits of some Eastern European citizenries, as well as their low levels of societal trust in general. Having
been forced to join all [337_TD$DIFF]sorts of organizations during communist times, citizens in post-communist European nations were
eager not to join any in democratic times. [338_TD$DIFF] Instead, they chose to continue, instead, to rely on the informal networks that had
played such a critical role in helping them get by earlier.
Experiential aspects also explain political patterns at the other end of the continuum captured by Factor 1. We ﬁnd two
types of countries on the side of the “active polities,” and they are quite different, depending mainly on their position on
[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. (a) Biplot of all political practices, including association types, Factors 1 and 2. (b) Biplot of all political practices, including association types, Factors 1
and 3. (c) Biplot of all political practices, including association types, Factors 1 and 4.
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Factor 2. [339_TD$DIFF]Wehave already seen that France stands highest on political contentionmeasures (Fig.1). Again, history is key here.
If anything, three major successful revolutions between 1789 and 1848, and a succession of efﬁcacious contentious episodes
since then have taught the French that “taking to the streets” often works: political power either falls, or it responds under
pressure. In this country, various forms of “disruptive” action (e.g. demonstrations, building occupations, even strikes) may
thus be understood as a more natural route to political socialization than,[340_TD$DIFF] for instance, joining a voluntary association. The
underlying reason for such a pattern of political participation must be found in the political structure itself. France has been
dubbed the ideal-typical “statist” nation (Birnbaum& Badie,1983; Dyson,1980; Jepperson, 2002). The state has traditionally
embodied the pursuit of rational progress in the name of society, but it remains fairly cut-off from society in its organization
and practice: its mission, rather, is carried forward by a highly elitist bureaucracy that is accountable mostly to itself and
often acts as [180_TD$DIFF]an agent of social division, rather than cooperation (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995; Ancelovici,
2008). Ongoing coordination and negotiation of societal claims, [341_TD$DIFF] as in Sweden, or institutionalized pressure (through
lobbying or the courts [249_TD$DIFF]), as in the United States,[342_TD$DIFF] are both unpractical and illegitimate. “The street,” by contrast, is not only one
of the few remaining avenues for channeling demands, it is also a well-recognized one. French governments have, for
instance, a long history of acknowledging various disruptive groups [343_TD$DIFF]– from striking public-sector employees to the
disaffected youths of the suburbs [344_TD$DIFF]– and, often, of settling disputes in terms that are favorable to them in “a continuous
process of signaling, negotiation, and struggle” (Tilly, 1986; also see Friedman, [181_TD$DIFF] 988).
France represents one extreme on Factor 2. TheUnited States is itsmirror image. [182_TD$DIFF] actor 2 opposes countries that “boycott”
and “petition” (e.g. the US) to countries that “demonstrate”, “occupy buildings” and “strike [345_TD$DIFF]” (Fig. 1). But when associational
variables are included in the model (Fig. 2), the temporal structure of the opposition becomes even more remarkable. Not
only do Americans join a lot of associations, as [183_TD$DIFF]de Tocqueville noticed long ago; they work more in them (the latter variable
helps differentiate the United States from Sweden, for instance, in spite of the countries’ proximity on other political
dimensions).What this suggests is that the axis for Factor 2may be read –with some qualiﬁcations – as the opposition along
the statist-societal dimension identiﬁed by Jepperson (e.g., 2002): countries not only harbor quantitatively different
[(Fig._4)TD$FIG]
Fig. 4. Multiple correspondence analysis, [391_TD$DIFF]Hungary 2000–2004.
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amounts of political activity,[346_TD$DIFF] but they also have qualitatively different rhythms of political life, for clear historical-
institutional reasons. In other words, the relative stateness of a polity might stand behind the time structure of its politics.
4.4. Corporateness and the cultural meaning of associational forms
Next we look at the disaggregated types of associations [347_TD$DIFF]inwhich peopleworked and of which theyweremembers. Fig. 3a
simply presents the F1 [348_TD$DIFF](Factor-1) and F2 (Factor-2) projection on the basis of the added information. It shows, again, that the
countries that are generally very active on all dimensions of action tend [349_TD$DIFF]also to be associated with associational
memberships of all kinds: religious, environmental and educational associations, unions, as well as sports associations.4
Although Factors 1 (volume) and 2 (time structure) represent, by far, the most important sources of cross-national variation
in political practice, there is much to gain from a close-up analysis of Factors 3 and 4. Factor 3 (Fig. 3b) opposes the countries
with high levels of union membership (most of them Scandinavian, plus Austria and the Netherlands) to countries with
heavy strike and building- [350_TD$DIFF]occupation activities (mostly France and Italy). This is not a paradox: the labor movement takes a
different shape in different nations (Western, 1997): strikes along this dimension are associated with a speciﬁc union
tradition, represented by the French-Italianmodel, which historically derives from anarcho-syndicalism and tends to rely on
confrontational episodes and organizations. The fact that demonstrations are also strongly and positively associated with
Factor 3 suggests that – in those countries well represented on the upper segment of the vertical axis, such as France, Italy,
the United States and Belgium – demonstrations might be mainly associated with labor militancy. On the opposite end of
Factor 3, we ﬁnd countries characterized by more “corporate” forms of social organization, as deﬁned by Jepperson (2002)
and Schmitter (1974). Labor participation here is inscribed, fundamentally and phenomenologically, in a different mode of
collective belonging, based on large membership organizations that are generally in charge of arbitraging conﬂicts. More
generally, associational memberships in this context oftenmean the enactment of a role: [184_TD$DIFF]they are an expression of corporate
group belonging (e.g., workers) muchmore than a form of individual “choice” or a voluntary commitment. They therefore do
[(Fig._5)TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. Multiple correspondence analysis, [392_TD$DIFF]Poland 2000–2004.
4 Sporting associations are signiﬁcantly politicized in some national/historical contexts and not in others. We opted to include them, but results are
essentially identical if they are removed.
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not necessarily entail much “active” involvement and are not associated with high levels of volunteer work (Fourcade &
Schofer, forthcoming).
This difference really [351_TD$DIFF]becomes apparent when we look at Factor 4 (Fig. 3c). Factor 4 does not account for much of the
variance (8.14%) but again, the pattern is interesting and [352_TD$DIFF]interpretable. The main analytical interest of this fourth dimension
is that it helps single out the Scandinavian countries, particularly Denmark and to a lesser extent Sweden, [353_TD$DIFF]that strongly
associate high levels of union membership with strikes (but not building occupations). As many commentators (e.g. Esping-
Andersen, [185_TD$DIFF] 990; Lipset, 1961) have suggested, Denmark indeed stands quite apart from the rest of the Scandinavian world,
particularly in terms of the pugnacity of its labor movement.
5. Comparing political spaces
From an externalist point of view, a country is a point in the “space of polities,” a location relative to other societies along
the dimensions we have just identiﬁed [354_TD$DIFF]and to which we have attributed deﬁnite meanings. The location of a country in
multidimensional space characterizes a nation’s political practices within the broad patterns of variation observed across
societies. From an internalist perspective, however, a country is itself a differentiated space of political practices, a bundle of [186_TD$DIFF]
factor loadings that reﬂect the constellation of practices (and non-practices) observed therein. At the onset of this paper, we
gave ourselves the task of describing the political spaces of individual countries and deriving from such examination insights
into the meaning of different political practices in their context of performance. In Figs. 4–8, [187_TD$DIFF]we provide, as illustrative
examples, the ﬁrst and second dimensions for ﬁve countries (Sweden, Hungary, Poland, United States and France), each of
which represents a distinctive polity type in the space of polities.
The [355_TD$DIFF]MCA suggest a number of conclusions: Hungary (Fig. 4) is the most distinctive country of all, in the sense that it is
composed of a very homogeneous (politically speaking) population whose members are not very active (at the center of the
map). To the extent that people participate in contentious politics, they engage mostly in relatively benign forms of claims-
making (e.g., petitions). Furthermore, and in contrast with the other three countries, participants in “contentious” political
activities inHungaryare verymuchoutliers. Supplementarycluster analyses reveal that the [356_TD$DIFF]most active of these participators
are much younger than in other countries, suggesting important cohort effects. Importantly, and dovetailing on our earlier
comparison between Hungary and Poland, the Polish “space of political practices” looks quite similar (Fig. 5). This is not
[(Fig._6)TD$FIG]
Fig. 6. Multiple correspondence analysis, [393_TD$DIFF]Sweden 2000–2004.
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surprising: countries that look structurally similar in the within- [357_TD$DIFF]country analyses will load together in the broad cross-national
analysis.
In contrast to Hungary, the political spaces of the United States, Sweden and France are much more differentiated.
However, the principles of this differentiation vary substantially across countries. For instance, in France [358_TD$DIFF](Fig. 8), high
participation and membership in voluntary associations is associated with labor activity and generally with contentious
political practices. In the United States (Fig. 7) and Sweden (Fig. 6 [359_TD$DIFF]), on the other hand, those who are highly involved in
associations are substantively different people from thosewho carry out more contentious actions. [360_TD$DIFF] or example, the USmap
shows nicely that people with high levels of membership and participation in voluntary associations are clustered much
closer to the people who “would never do” the more contentious types of political actions [361_TD$DIFF]than in France, where contentious
action and associational memberships tend to overlap.
Interestingly, Sweden and the United States have similar structures of “non-participation” (top left corner of Figs. 6 and 7,[362_TD$DIFF]
respectively). In France, on the other hand, there appears to be a greater disconnection betweenmembership in associations
and political participation: the non-members/non-workers in associations are an entirely separate group, whereas in the
United States and Sweden they are closely associated with the “might dos.”
Obviously these analyses are extremely partial and are only meant to illustrate the analytical usefulness of an approach
conceivedinrelational terms. It isofcoursepossible toreﬁnetheempirical toolkitmuchfurtherandgetanevengreaterpurchase
on the cases. One such strategy involves including more demographic data into the analysis, in order to assess whether the
differences we observe in terms of practices also correspond to sociological differences in terms of the people who carry out
thesepractices.Weknowthesevariables(education, income,maritalstatus,gender, age,ethnicity, religiosity,[363_TD$DIFF]etc.)matteracross
the board: people who are more educated, for instance, tend to participate more in politics. But they might matter differently
acrossnations, asevidenced, for instance,by thedifferentpositioningofhighly religiouspeoplevis-à-vispolitics in theUSand in
France (Figs. 7and8,[364_TD$DIFF] respectively):moderately (rel-2)andhighly (rel-3) religiouspeople inFrancearenotactiveat all,whereas
in theUStheyaremore sympathetic towardcontentious politics (prevalenceof [365_TD$DIFF]“mightdos”) andat least ambivalent toward it,
aswell as closer to the associationallyactive. A second strategywouldbe toanalyzeevenmore inductivelyhowthepopulation
falls intocategoriesofpeople sharingacommonpatternofpolitical activity, [366_TD$DIFF]thenanalyzecountriesasvaryingconstellationsof
these categories or clusters (see, e.g., [367_TD$DIFF] Bail (2008) for such an approach using fuzzy-set analysis, or Bonikowski (2010) for a
similar perspective using hierarchical cluster analysis). These strategies, however, might dilute the comparative edgewe are
seeking here by assuming correspondence among categories of individuals across countries.
6. Conclusion: [188_TD$DIFF] relation and structure
Our ﬁrst purpose in this paper has been to show the usefulness of a structural-relational approach, grounded in geometric
data analysis, to generate insights into the understanding of cross-national variations in the practice of politics. The main
[(Fig._7)TD$FIG]
Fig. 7. Multiple correspondence analysis, with supplementary variables (religiosity, education, gender): USA 2000–2004.
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advantage of such an approach is that it takes the indexical quality of political practices seriously. What any individual
practice “means” always depends in some sense on the context of use: who takes it up, when, within what kind of
institutional ﬁeld (Amable, 2003), and against which alternative and seemingly available practices (what Bourdieu, echoing
Foucault, elsewhere (1993) calls “the space of possibles”). We use the term indexical not because we think that political
practices are reducible to semantic analysis but to point out that, just like utterances take their meaning only when situated
against a background of expectations and discursive contexts, political practices cannot and should not be limited to
internalist readings.
Bourdieu’s critique of substantialism was a natural starting point for this study. A naïvely substantialist analysis would
treat political practices like strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, riots, voting, [368_TD$DIFF] etc. as discrete and isolated forms, and, [369_TD$DIFF]what is
more, as if their meaning [370_TD$DIFF]were given and indeed invariable. It would performwhat Whitehead (1925) called “the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness.” Although this approach is quite common in the social sciences, it must be resisted. The political
actors of different countriesmay take up a speciﬁc political practice (e.g. a protest action) for different reasons, with different
temporal logics, and more or less intensity. In other words, when using terms like ‘petitioning’ to compare and contrast
practices in different countries, we should be careful to not make “false friends” of the term by allowing “surface form to
indicate probable meaning” (Enﬁeld, 2010: 1). Relational analysis “is a reminder that comparison is possible only from
system to system, and that the search for direct equivalences between features grasped in isolation, whether, appearing at
ﬁrst sight different, they prove to be ‘functionally’ or technically equivalent (like the drinks of Pernod in France and shôchû or
saké in Japan) or nominally identical (the practices of golf in France and Japan, for instance), risks unduly identifying
structurally different properties or wrongly distinguishing structurally identical properties” (Bourdieu, 1998: 6).
Furthermore, by comparing “substitutable” practices vis-à-vis other practices within each polity (to obtain a “space of
position takings”), and also comparing these spaces “system to system,” we are compelled to adopt a resolutely inductive
approach to the theorization of political difference. [371_TD$DIFF]We ground it in the analysis of political space (an empirical construction)
instead of politics on paper (an [372_TD$DIFF]a priori one), and in the space of countries instead of countries on paper.
The space of political position-takings roughly corresponds to the social space as deﬁned by the historical trajectories of
the countries we have investigated (e.g. countries that experienced long and repeated periods of repression and domination
by external powers or autocracies tend to have a “low volume” of political engagement as captured by the WVS) as well as
[(Fig._8)TD$FIG]
Fig. 8. Multiple correspondence analysis, with supplementary variables (religiosity, education, gender), France 2000–2004.
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their political institutions (e.g. the degrees of statism or corporatism within the political and bureaucratic ﬁelds). The
secondary literature is precious here.[373_TD$DIFF] It helps demonstrate that the experience of political life leads to the embodiment of
political competencies that are quite different from country to country even if they generate, in the dialectic with objective
political, economic, and social realities, similar regularities of political practice (e.g. the high volume of membership in
associations is achieved according to different common- [374_TD$DIFF]sense strategies and within different material realities in the U.S.
and Sweden). Even conﬁgurations of political practices thatmay look superﬁcially similar turn out to be organized according
to quite different temporal logics. Thus,[375_TD$DIFF] the French protest according to quite a different political rhythm than [376_TD$DIFF]their
counterparts in the U.S. Even the groups of people who protest in the U.S. look different than those in Francewho use similar
strategies, indicating that comparing political practices such as protests, in and of themselves, is misleading. [377_TD$DIFF]
6.1. Structural relationalism versus interactional relationalism
Importantly, and incontrast to theneo-institutionalist perspective (e.g.Meyer, Boli, & Thomas,1997), no country's pattern is
explained, [233_TD$DIFF]a priori, by a relationship of direct interaction with “world society,” or by a political, economic or cultural
relationship with another country. In other words, [378_TD$DIFF]because the national patterns we are analyzing here are rooted in the
behavior of individuals, we are eschewing the kind of relationalism that presupposes actual connections between empirical
persons or institutions (in this case states). Rather,wehave treated countries as epistemological entities deﬁned by statistical
properties that could be easilyﬁlled byany particular empirical countrywithmoreor less the sameproperties. [191_TD$DIFF]As pointed out
earlier, Bourdieu’s (2005: 77) is a structural relationalismas opposed toan interactional one (DeNooy, 2003; Fourcade, 2007).
With that rhetorical precaution in mind, however, wemust acknowledge the continued relevance of country-to-country
forms of relational consciousness, which express themselves in two main ways: ﬁrst, through the emulation of ideas,
strategies and practices, [379_TD$DIFF]via the circulation and interaction of people (activists, organizers) around theworld. The Arab spring
might be the most recent example of the power of imitation in international politics, but the post-[380_TD$DIFF]1989 wave of
democratization in Eastern Europe comes to mind, too. The second channel refers to people's implicit understandings of
their country’s place vis-à-vis other traditions and other polities. The study by Pouliot (2010) of the diplomatic ﬁeld captures
the connection between individual habitus and international relations especially well, and [381_TD$DIFF]it offers a striking illustration of
how individuals acting as representatives of their countries on the international scene come to “embody” these countries’
structural properties.[192_TD$DIFF]
Similarly, many Swedish political actors understand themselves as ambassadors of political goodwill, and this “mission”
is very self-conscious both within the government and among the national population—from the ﬂocks of missionaries
heading from Sweden in the past, to the large number of joiners in international organizations today. The French, for their
part, continue to live out their old legacy through their uncommon use of public protests—less, perhaps, as a reenactment of
their own history than as a strong assertion of political-cultural distinctiveness in a Europeanized (or globalized) world
where homogeneity is perceived as an increasing threat. By contrast, the populations of nations on the periphery of the
world system do behave inways that are consistent with a lower engagement in their own nation-state—with more passive
politics (at least as measured by the WVS) and high levels of emigration. Finally, politicians everywhere frequently
manipulate public representations of other nation-[382_TD$DIFF]states in an effort to draw support or vilify certain policies. Most
continental European countries are frequently described as “socialist” in U.S. political discourse, for instance. Regardless of
whether such statements are adequate representations of some underlying reality, they do intervene in the very political
activities that they allegedly describe (Weider, 1974).
Obviously, we cannot fully engage these kinds of concrete interstate relations here, let alone the sometimes violent
geopolitics, [383_TD$DIFF]that lies beneath the structuring of local politicalﬁelds.While it is certainly possible to extrapolate, aswedowith
Sweden or Hungary above, some suggestive interpretations about people’s political behavior from their country’s position
within the global political, economic, and cultural power structure, our purpose here has been more modest. Instead, we
have been interested primarily in describing states as a product of their populations’ position within a broader system of
relations of behavioral proximity and distance, some of which are strongly determined through interstate relationships (e.g.
the cases of Hungary and Poland, subject toGerman then Soviet inﬂuence in recent times) and some ofwhich are less [193_TD$DIFF]directly
so (e.g. Argentina)
6.2. Polity structure and individual action
Importantly, the method has allowed us to produce a fairly simple framework for thinking about [194_TD$DIFF]political differences
across countries. By far the most pregnant dimension of variation has to do with the sheer volume of political engagement,
whether it is of a contentious or a more institutionalized type. Thus, [384_TD$DIFF] in our sample the politically active (in relative terms)
nations of Scandinavia and the United States are opposed on the “volume” dimension to countries like Hungary, Poland, and
Argentina. To be sure, the relative passivity evidenced byWVS survey respondents in these [385_TD$DIFF]latter three cases (in 2005)might
have its roots in these countries’ common historical experience of authoritarian rule. But a closer examination of the cases,
looking at the ﬁeld of politics within, also suggests that the similar positions Hungary and Argentina occupy in the space of
politiesmay be conditioned by different socializing experiences among these countries' respective citizenries. First, the rules
of the political game obviously differ across these nations, if only due to their idiosyncratic historical paths. Second, the same
political practices may be the object of substantively different uses but still produce the result that, overall, these countries’
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populations tend to “behave” similarly (that is, they tend to be positioned as less politically engaged than other nations in the
sample). In that waygeometric data analysis [386_TD$DIFF]serves as a complement, rather than a substitute, tomore in-depth comparisons
(Breiger, 2009; Ragin, 2000). The latter are still necessary to make full sense of the patterns observed.
The second dimension, which we have called the temporal structure of political activity, overlaps to a great extent with
the opposition between statist and societal modes of political sovereignty (Jepperson, 1993, 2002; Schofer & Fourcade-
Gourinchas, 2001). The third dimension opposes “taken-for-granted” modes of belonging to more “voluntary” ones and
singles out countries along the corporate-non-corporate dimension as high contributors (with the membership-driven
societies of Sweden and the Netherlands opposed to the more voluntary populations of France, the United States and Italy).
Finally, the fourth [387_TD$DIFF]dimension Factor opposes the class struggle to the moral dimension of political activity, with the
Netherlands (on the side of human rights, peace, and the environment) and Denmark (on the side of labor militancy) as
highest contributors.
But our aim is obviously not simply descriptive. The fact that patterns in 2004 can be interpreted, in no small measure,
through the lens of the conceptual apparatus Jepperson and Meyer (1991) and Jepperson (1993, 2002) propose, suggests
that, in spite of the extraordinarymessiness of individual countries' histories, regularities tend to be long-lasting, supporting
the production of a relatively stable conceptual framework. Thus,[388_TD$DIFF] one contribution of this study is to have systematically
grounded the neo-institutionalist concepts of stateness and corporateness (Jepperson,1993, 2002) in empirical variations in
the volume and rhythm of the political activities that individuals undertake. Certainly, each national political space is
structured in a way that reﬂects its speciﬁc genesis, history, and the particular struggles that took place within it. These
institutions and sedimented histories frame individuals’ socialization into politics [389_TD$DIFF]by shaping the range and nature of
political actions, organizations, andmeanings. [390_TD$DIFF] n the end, relational analyses and techniques help us not only show that there
is a discoverable order in these histories and struggles, but also reconstruct the very categories and objects of the comparison
in a way that is, perhaps, truer to the phenomenology of individuals’ experience of politics across nations.
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